作者：若迷 在 驴鸣镇 发贴, 来自 http://www.hjclub.org
1）地方法院的判决书中有关监护权同意令的签署前后的部分及翻译：
On June 2, 1999, attorney Kevin Weaver met with Mr. He and the Bakers and fully advised Mr. He and the Bakers of the legal ramifications of filing a petition for custody and of signing a consent order awarding custody of AMH. Mrs. He, after being fully advised of the meeting and of the purpose of the meeting by Mr. He, waived her right to be present at the meeting and told Mr. He to tell the others at the meeting that she was ready to proceed. Mr. Weaver answered all of Mr. He’s and the Bakers’ questions during the meeting. Mr. He later advised Mrs. He of the information that Mr. Weaver imparted at the meeting.
在1999年6月2日，律师凯文韦弗先生会见了贺先生和贝克夫妇，并充分告知他们提交转移贺梅监护权请愿书和签署监护权同意令的法律后果。贺太太在贺先生充分告知了她这次会议的目的之后，放弃了她出席会议的权利，并告诉贺先生，让他告诉在会上的人，说她准备进行。韦弗先生在会上回答了所有贺先生和贝克夫妇提出的问题。贺先生后来通知了他太太在会上韦弗先生给予的资讯。
_ On June 3, 1999, Ms. Chunn and Mr. Kenny Yao, an experienced interpreter in English and Mandarin Chinese, met with Mrs. He, alone, in the Hes’ apartment. Ms. Chunn wanted to make certain that Mrs. He understood what she would be doing if Mrs. He signed a consent custody order, and whether Mrs. He was one hundred percent willing for a transfer of custody of AMH from the Hes to the Bakers. Ms. Chunn explained to Mrs. He the things that Kevin Weaver had said to Ms. Chunn, the Bakers, and Mr. He, the day before in the meeting in Mr. Weaver’s office. Mrs. He indicated that she understood everything that Ms. Chunn had told her through Mr. Yao. Mrs. He asked no questions of Ms. Chunn, through Mr. Yao.
_在1999年6月3日，丘恩女士和另一个在英语和普通话有经验的翻译肯尼姚先生在贺氏夫妇的公寓会见了夫人。丘恩女士想要明确的是，贺太太懂得如果她在签监护令协议书上签了字她将来该做什么，丘恩女士想要明确贺太太是否百分之百地愿意将贺梅的监护权移交给贝克夫妇。丘恩女士向贺太太解说了凯文韦弗前一天在韦弗办公告诉过我、贝克夫妇、和贺先生的话。贺夫人表示，她明白一切通过姚先生的（翻译、解释）丘恩女士的话。通过姚，贺太太被问到，她对丘恩女士已经没有问题了。
_ On June 4, 1999, Ms. Sarah Cloud, with the assistance of a qualified interpreter, privately met with Mrs. He, without Mr. He, and fully explained the legal ramifications of both the Petition For Custody and the Consent Order Awarding Custody, both of which Mrs. He later voluntarily signed.
_在1999年6月4日，莎拉云女士与一名合格的翻译的协助下，私下会见了他贺太太，何先生没有参加，充分说明了申请监护权和监护权转移令的法律后果，这两个文件都是贺太太后来自愿签署的。
_ The Hes were familiar with the Juvenile Court for Memphis and Shelby County, Tennessee, before June 4, 1999, because they had sought the services of the Juvenile Court on or about February 23, 1999, when they spoke to Ms. Sarah Cloud about long-term foster care through the State of Tennessee Department of Childrens Services. Although the Hes had consulted with attorneys in the past regarding other legal matters, the Hes never inquired at Juvenile Court about getting an attorney to provide the Hes legal advice concerning the original transfer of custody of AMH.
_贺氏夫妇在1999年6月4日之前就分别与孟菲斯少年法庭和谢尔比县少年法庭熟悉，因为他们已于1999年2月23日就寻求过这两个少年法院的服务，当时他们跟云萨拉女士谈到了通过田纳西州的儿童事务部有关长期寄养的问题。尽管贺氏夫妇曾就其他方面的法律事项咨询过律师，但他们从来没有要求过少年法庭为他们提供一位律师，以便就贺梅最初的监护权问题给予咨询。
_ A few months after the Hes signed the June 4, 1999, Consent Order Awarding Custody, the Hes went to the Juvenile Court and spoke with Ms. Cloud about getting assistance to file a petition to regain custody of AMH.
_在1999年6月4日贺氏夫妇签署了监护权转移令数个月后，他们到少年法院和云女士谈到协助提交一份请愿书要求重获监护权。
_ Both Mr. and Mrs. He had many opportunities to obtain legal advice, and did receive legal advice from attorney Kevin Weaver, about their decision to petition the Juvenile Court to place custody of AMH with the Bakers, before the Hes signed the petition and consent order.
_贺先生和夫人有很多机会获得法律咨询，并且在他们签署请愿书和同意令之前，就获得了律师凯文韦弗有关他们决定向少年法院请愿以及将贺梅的监护权转移给贝克夫妇方面的法律咨询。
_ There was no law, rule, regulation, fraud, duress, undue influence, or trickery which caused the Hes, at the outset, to petition the Juvenile Court to give legal custody of AMH to the Bakers.
_没有任何法律、规则、规例、欺诈、胁迫、不当影响、巧取豪夺造成贺氏夫妇向少年法院请愿并使得他们要求将贺梅的法律监护权给予贝克夫妇。
_ The evidence establishes that there was no conspiracy to deprive the Hes of their right to due process or to the custody of AMH.
_证据证明，对贺梅的监护权以及在转移的过程中，没有任何阴谋要剥夺贺氏夫妇的权利。
_ Ms. Sarah Cloud, Ms. Diane Chunn, Mid-South Christian Services (“Mid-South”), Mr. Kenny Yao, Mr. Kevin Weaver, Ms. Kimbrough Mullins, Ms. Linda Holmes, Dr. David Goldstein, Ms. Kathryn Story, and Mr. Larry Parrish played no part, individually or in concert or conspiracy with any other persons, to encourage, discourage, or facilitate, at any time: (1) the denial of either of the Hes’ legal rights or entitlements; (2) the Hes’ filing of a Petition for Custody in Juvenile Court on June 4, 1999, seeking to place AMH’s custody with the Bakers; (3) the Hes’ signing the June 4, 1999, Consent Order Awarding Custody of AMH to the Bakers; or (4) the Bakers’ decision to file a petition to adopt AMH and to terminate the Hes’ parental rights.
_萨拉云女士、戴安娜丘恩、中南部基督教服务处（“中南部”）肯尼姚先生、韦弗凯文先生、金布罗穆林斯、霍姆斯琳达女士、大卫戈尔茨坦博士，帕瑞斯先生无论在任何时候都没有单独或协同或共谋、鼓励、不鼓励或协助，这包括：（1）对贺氏夫妇或法律权利或者剥夺应享权利;（2）贺氏夫妇的一对少年法院羁押在提交呈请书于1999年6月4日，试图转移贺梅的监护权给贝克夫妇;（3）贺氏夫妇1999年6月4日签署同意令;或（4）贝克夫妇的决定提交一份请愿书，终止贺氏夫妇父母权。
（注：以上英文部分引用的的原文；中文是若迷翻译的。原文部分引自地方法院判决书：
http://www.parentalrightsandjustice.com/upload/site/1/27/Childers_Final_Opinion.htm ）
2）田纳西最高法院的判决书中有关监护权同意令的签署前后的部分及翻译：
In a meeting at the Bakers’ home, the Bakers told the father that they were unwilling to keep A.M.H. as long-term foster parents but wanted to adopt her.
According to the Bakers’ testimony, because the parents of A.M.H. would not agree to an adoption, they entered into an oral agreement after the father of A.M.H. led them in prayer and the parties discussed the issue.
在贝克家的会议上，贝克夫妇告诉贺梅父亲，他们不愿意继续作为长期代养父母，但希望收养她。根据贝克夫妇的证词，因为贺梅的父母不同意收养，在贺梅的父亲带领他们祈祷后达成了口头协议，各方并就此进行了讨论。
Under the oral agreement, the Bakers would raise A.M.H. until she was eighteen, and the parents of A.M.H. would retain their parental rights. The Mid-South counselor testified that, in a meeting with Mid-South's attorney and the Bakers on May 19, 1999, the father of A.M.H. stated that the mother and he wanted to continue the custody arrangement but maintain their parental rights. The Bakers then pursued a legal change of custody.
根据口头协议，贝克夫妇将抚养贺梅直到她18岁，贺梅的父母将保留他们的父母权。Mid-South的顾问作证说，在有Mid-South的律师和贝克夫妇在场的1999年5月19日的会上，贺梅的父亲说，贺梅的母亲和他想继续保持这个监护权安排，但仍维持其父母权。贝克夫妇在此之后寻求一个在法律上生效的监护权转移。
On June 2, 1999, the father of A.M.H., the Bakers, the Mid-South counselor, and Mid-South’s attorney met to explain to the father the legal effect of granting the Bakers temporary custody. According to Mrs. Baker’s testimony, the father was told by the attorney “that this could go for one year or it could go for 18 years.” Mid-South’s attorney testified that he informed the parents that by giving up custody, “unless everybody consents to give the custody back . . . anybody that gives up even temporary custody takes a risk that . . . the court may not give custody back.” He further testified:
在1999年6月2日，贺梅的父亲、贝克夫妇、Mid-South的顾问、和Mid-South的律师会面，向父亲解释给予贝克夫妇临时监护权的法律效力。据贝克女士的证词，Mid-South的律师告诉父亲“这可能进行一年，也可能进行18年。”Mid-South的律师作证说，他告诉父母，如果放弃监护权，那么“除非每个人都同意将监护权转移回去…任何人放弃，即使是暂时放弃监护权，也冒着一个风险…法院可能不会将监护权再转移回来。”。贺梅的父亲进一步作证说：
And I’m sure I would have given some hypotheticals about what some of those reasons [for not returning custody to the parents] might be; you know, that if the couple that wanted custody back [engaged in] drug use or alcohol use or some kind of abuse or not having a place for the child to live or not – you know, those sort of things could prevent you from getting custody back.
我肯定，我被给予了某些假设——不退还给家长监护权一些原因也许是；你知道，如果要求要回监护权的夫妇使用毒品或酗酒、或从事一些虐待、或没有一个可以让这孩子居住的地方 - 你知道，那类事情可以阻止你要回监护权。
On June 4, 1999, Mid-South’s attorney went with the Bakers and the parents of A.M.H. to the Juvenile Court of Shelby County to obtain a consent order transferring custody of A.M.H. to the Bakers. A juvenile court officer drafted the “Petition for Custody” and a “Consent Order Awarding Custody.” The consent order does not mention child support or visitation. A juvenile court interpreter, the juvenile court officer, and Mid-South’s attorney spoke with the mother privately before she signed the order; the mother was told that the order would enable the Bakers to obtain health insurance for A.M.H. The juvenile court officer who drafted the consent order testified that the mother was very concerned that the arrangement be temporary and that the parents would continue to have “open visitation” with A.M.H. through the duration of the Bakers’ custody.
在1999年6月4日，为了得到转让贺梅监护权给贝克夫妇的同意令，Mid-South的律师与贝克夫妇、贺梅父母一道去了谢尔比县青少年法庭。 一位少年法庭人员起草了“监护权请愿书”和“给予监护权同意令”。该同意令没有提及子女抚养费或探视子女。一位少年法庭翻译、少年法院人员、以及Mid-South的律师在签署该命令之前和贺梅的母亲进行了私下的谈话；母亲被告知该命令将使得贺梅可以得到医疗保险。起草该命令的少年法院人员作证说，母亲非常担心，这项安排是暂时的，而家长会继续在贝克家监护期间对贺梅“开放探视”。
Despite the mother’s concerns that the arrangement be temporary, the juvenile court officer added a guardianship provision to the consent order so that the Bakers could obtain medical insurance for A.M.H. Mrs. Baker stated that there was no discussion of guardianship during the meeting between the Bakers and the parents of A.M.H. prior to the execution of the consent order in juvenile court.
尽管母亲关注这项安排是暂时的，少年法庭人员在同意令中增加了一个监护人条款，为的是使贝克夫妇可以为贺梅获得医疗保险。贝克太太说，在执行同意令之前，在贝克夫妇与贺梅父母的会见上没有就监护人问题进行讨论。
The Bakers testified that as part of the custody agreement, the parents agreed that the Bakers would raise A.M.H. until she was eighteen years old and that the child would refer to the Bakers as “mommy” and “daddy.” Contrary to the Bakers’ testimony, the juvenile court officer testified that the parents were not agreeing that the Bakers could raise A.M.H. until she was eighteen years old. Indeed, the juvenile court officer testified that the mother “was fairly adamant that at some point she wanted her child back.” The mother testified as follows: “I was told I can get my daughter back at any time. I asked him three or four times about that.” Finally, the juvenile court interpreter, Pastor Kenny Yao, testified that the mother understood the agreement to be temporary and for the purpose of obtaining medical insurance for A.M.H. An order transferring custody and awarding guardianship was entered by consent; there was no court hearing on the matter.
贝克夫妇作证说，作为托管协议的一部分，家长同意，贝克夫妇将抚养贺梅直到她18岁，而孩子将称贝克夫妇为“妈妈”和“爸爸”。与贝克夫妇的证词相反，少年法院人员作证说，父母也不同意贝克夫妇抚养贺梅直到她18岁。事实上，少年法院人员作证说，母亲“是相当坚定的，在某个时间，她希望把她的孩子要回来。”母亲作证如下：“我被告知我可以在任何时候把我的女儿要回来。我就此问了他三四次。” 。最后，少年法庭翻译，牧师肯尼姚作证说，母亲的理解，该协定是暂时的，为的是达到使得贺梅获得医疗保险的目的；在此事项上，没有任何法院的听证。
……
4. Custody
When this Court reverses a lower court’s termination of parental rights in a contest between parents and non-parents for custody, we usually remand the case to the trial court for the preparation and implementation of a plan to return custody of the child to the parent. In this case, however, we must first address the consent order entered by the juvenile court in June of 1999 that transferred the custody and guardianship of A.M.H. to the Bakers. Unless we conclude that the consent order is unenforceable, the parents of A.M.H. have no superior rights to the custody of A.M.H. The parents argue that the consent order is unenforceable and ask that they be granted custody.
当该法院在推翻下级法院就父母与非父母之间竞争而导致的判定终止其父母的父母权时，我们通常将案件退回到初审法院使其准备和实施返回儿童监护权的计划。在这种情况下，然而，我们必须首先强调少年法院1999年6月移交监护权给贝克夫妇。除非我们得出结论：同意命令是不能强制执行的；贺梅的父母不具有对贺梅监护权的优先权。贺梅的父母争辩说，同意命令是不能强制执行的，并且他们要求给予他们监护权。
In an initial proceeding, natural parents have superior rights in relation to non-parents who seeking custody under article I, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. Blair v. Badenhope, 77 S.W.3d 137, 141 (Tenn. 2002). But “absent extraordinary circumstances,” parents are not entitled to superior rights when seeking to modify a valid order placing custody with a non-parent “even when that order resulted from the parent’s voluntary relinquishment of custody to the non-parent.” Id. at 143. Despite this rule, we have recognized four circumstances in which a natural parent continues to enjoy a presumption of superior rights to custody:
在最初的诉讼程序中，亲生父母相对于非父母在寻求监护权上具有优先权，第一款田纳西州宪法第8优先权。布莱尔诉Badenhope，77 SW3d 137，141（2002年田纳西州）。但是，“没有特殊情况，”父母都无权在寻求一个有效的修改，以便将与非父“即使是为了从父母的监护自愿放弃对非父母监护，导致上级的权利。”同上。在143。尽管这个规则，我们认识到，在这四种情形自然父母继续享有监护权的权利推定优势：
(1) When no order exists that transfers custody from the natural parent;
(2) When the order transferring custody from the natural parent is accomplished by fraud or without notice to the parent;
(3) When the order transferring custody from the natural parent is invalid on its face; and
(4) When the natural parent cedes only temporary and informal custody to the
non-parents.
（1） 从亲生父母那里转移监护权的法庭命令不存在；
（2） 从亲生父母那里转移监护权的命令伴随着欺诈或该父母未得到知会；
（3） 从亲生父母那里转移监护权的命令从表面上看就不合适；和
（4） 当亲生父母仅仅割让临时的和非正式的监护权给非亲生父母。
Id. Recognizing the possibility that in the informal setting of juvenile court unrepresented parents could enter into a formal order without understanding the actual effect of transferring custody, we have explained that it is only a parent’s “voluntary transfer of custody to a non-parent, with knowledge of the consequences of that transfer,” that will defeat a parent’s claim to superior rights of custody. Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
认识到有这种可能性，在青少年法庭的非正式的程序中，无代表律师的父母可能参与签订正式的命令，但却不理解这个转移监护权的实际后果，我们已经解释过，只有当父母“在自愿转移监护权给非父母时，了解他的这种行为的意义”，他的行为才能妨碍他对于优先权的主张（着重号是我们加的）。
The evidence establishes that the parents were misled as to the consequences of a change in custody and uninformed about the guardianship provision and, therefore, did not enter into the agreement with knowledge of the consequences of the transfer of custody and guardianship. Even if we only consider the testimony from witnesses that the chancery court found to be credible, the evidence shows that the parents were instructed that the transfer of custody was temporary and that barring inappropriate conduct by the parents, custody would be returned to the parents. Mrs. Baker testified that, the parents were informed that the custody arrangement “could go for one year or it could go for eighteen years.”Mid-South’s attorney testified that, he informed the father of A.M.H. that if the Bakers did not consent to return A.M.H. to the parents’ custody, the court might not return custody in situations such as where “the couple that wanted custody back [engaged in] drug use or alcohol use or some kind of abuse or [did] not [have] a place for the child to live.” The juvenile court officer who drafted the consent order testified that, the mother was told that the custody transfer would be temporary and that the parents would have “open visitation.” The juvenile court officer also testified that the mother asked several times for verification that the transfer would be temporary before she would sign the consent order. The translator for the parties, Pastor Yao, testified that the mother understood the agreement to be temporary and for the purpose of obtaining medical insurance for A.M.H.
证据显示贺梅父母在关于监护权改变的后果的问题上被误导了，而且没有被告知有关监护人的条款，因此，他们并不是在具备了对监护权和监护人的转移所将带来的后果的情况下参与签订了协议。
即使我们只考虑chancery法庭认为是可靠的证人的证言，证据也显示：贺梅父母被告知，监护权的转移是暂时的，如果父母没有行为不端的话，孩子将还给父母。
贝克太太的证词说，贺梅父母被告知，关于监护权的安排“可以长达一年，也可以长达十八年”。
Mid-South的律师的证词是，他告诉贺梅的父亲，如果贝克夫妇不同意归还对于贺梅的监护权，法庭也许在诸如“希望收回监护权的父母酗酒、虐待、或没有地方让孩子住”的情况下不将监护权归还父母。
青少年法庭起草转移监护权命令的官员作证说，母亲被告知：监护只是暂时的，父母有不受限制的探视权。他还说，母亲在签字前问了好几遍，要求确认监护权的转移只是暂时的。
翻译姚牧师作证说，母亲理解监护权的转移是暂时的，只是为了让贺梅能得到医疗保险。
This evidence overwhelmingly shows that the parents’ voluntary relinquishment of custody was entered as a temporary measure to provide health insurance for A.M.H. with the full intent that custody would be returned. Therefore, we hold that the parents of A.M.H. did not voluntarily transfer custody and guardianship of A.M.H. to the Bakers with knowledge of the consequences and, therefore, are entitled to superior rights to custody. As we stated in Blair:
这些证据有说服力地证明：贺梅父母在自愿放弃监护权时，认为该转移是暂时的，只是为了让贺梅得到医疗保险，而他们是能够将其收回的。所以，我们认为，贺梅的父母在转移对贺梅的监护权时并不明了该转移的含义，因此继续保有对贺梅监护权的优先权。正如我们在Blair案中所说的：
Where a natural parent voluntarily relinquishes custody without knowledge of the effect of that act, then it cannot be said that these rights [to the care and custody of one’s child] were accorded the protection demanded by the Constitution. As such, application of the superior rights doctrine in a subsequent modification proceeding would be justified.
凡自愿放弃监护权的亲生父母没有对这种行为的影响有所了解，就不能说这些权利[照顾和养护自己的孩子]被给予的保护与宪法的要求相符合。因此，对优先权原则的应用在随后的程序修改中可以是合理的。
Blair, 77 S.W.3d at 148 n.3. Accordingly, we hereby revoke the parental consent to the change of custody and guardianship, and consider the competing claims of the parties, giving due deference to the parents’ superior rights to the care and custody of A.M.H.
布莱尔77在148 n.3 S.W.3d。据此，我们撤销贺梅父母对监护权和监护人转移的同意协议，同时考虑到各方对监护权的主张，我们对亲生父母对贺梅的监护权的优先权予以应有的尊重。
Under the superior rights doctrine, “a natural parent may only be deprived of custody of a child upon a showing of substantial harm to the child.” In re Askew, 993 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tenn. 1999).Therefore, the determination of a custodial dispute between a parent and a non-parent rests on a determination of whether there is substantial harm threatening a child’s welfare if the child returns to the parents. Only then may a court find a sufficiently compelling justification for the infringement of the parents’ fundamental right to raise a child as they see fit. See id. at 3.
按照优先权的理论，“只有在证据显示孩子的生身父母对子女有重大伤害时，父母的优先权才会被剥夺”。In re Askew, 993 S.W. 2d 1,4 (Tenn. 1999) 所以，对父母与非父母关于监护权的争议的决定，取决于如下的认定：如果孩子归还父母，对其权益存在着实质损害威胁，只有在那个时候，法庭才有可能在其认为合适的情况下，因极为充分的理由，侵夺父母抚养子女这样一种基本权利。
Here, the only evidence of substantial harm arises from the delay caused by the protracted litigation and the failure of the court system to protect the parent-child relationship throughout the proceedings. Evidence that A.M.H. will be harmed from a change in custody because she has lived and bonded with the Bakers cannot constitute the substantial harm required to prevent the parentsfrom regaining custody. We have previously rejected the 8 contention that when a child has been in the custody of a non-parent for a significant period of time, a lesser standard may be applied in determining whether parental rights may be terminated. In re Swanson, 2 S.W.3d at 188 n.13. “Such a standard would increase the likelihood for delaying cases in order that the child remain” in the custody of the non-parent. Id. The same reasoning applies in this situation.
这里，唯一可能提出的对贺梅的重大伤害，系来自本案的旷日持久和诉讼过程未能保护父母与子女的关系。关于贺梅和贝克夫妇长期在一起生活，对他们产生感情的说法，并不能构成法律要求的妨碍父母收回监护权的理由。本法庭先前已经拒绝了这样一个说法：如果孩子已经和非父母生活了相当长的时间，在决定是否停止父母的监护权时，适用的法律要求可以低一些。In re Swanson, 2 S. W. 3d at 188 n.13. “实行这样的标准，会助长非父母为取得监护权而在诉讼中有意拖延的行为”。这个论断对本案完全适用。
Additionally, we note that the testimony concerning the general conditions in China is not relevant to a finding of substantial harm. Financial advantage and affluent surroundings simply may not be a consideration in determining a custody dispute between a parent and a non-parent. See Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 582 (“[M]ere improvement in quality of life is not a compelling state interest and is insufficient to justify invasion of Constitutional rights.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The evidence at trial showed that the parents have overcome many obstacles to achieve financial stability and are ably taking care of their other two children. Given the lack of evidence of a threat of substantial harm to A.M.H. if she is returned to her parents, we conclude that physical custody of A.M.H. must be returned to the parents.
另外，我们注意到在证词中，关于中国的一般情况与孩子是否会受到严重伤害无关。家庭富有和周遭环境良好，对决定父母与非父母的监护权争议，简单的来讲不作为一个考虑因素。见Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 582。“生活条件的改善并不被认为是极为重大的公共利益，因此不能成为对个人宪法权利的侵夺的理由”。证词显示，贺梅的父母克服了许多困难并取得了经济上的稳定，并且很好地照料了他们的另两个子女。在无法证明如果贺梅归还其父母会受到重大伤害的情况下，我们认定对她的监护权应该归还其父母”。
Conclusion
Having found that the trial court erred in terminating Shao-Qiang (“Jack”) He’s and Qin (“Casey”) Luo’s parental rights, we dismiss the Petition for Adoption and Termination of Parental Rights and reinstate the parental rights of Shao-Qiang (“Jack”) He and Qin (“Casey”) Luo. Further, we revoke the parental consent to the change in custody and guardianship, vacate the juvenile court and chancery court orders concerning visitation, and designate the current custody and guardianship orders as temporary in nature.
他们发现，在终止贺绍强（“杰克”）和罗秦（“凯西”）的父母的权利上初审法院的错误，我们废除了收养情愿和终止父母权，恢复了贺绍强和罗秦的父母权。此外，我们取消转移监护权的父母同意书，空置少年法院和chancery法院的命令有关探视权，并指定当前的监护权和监护人具有临时的性质。
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. As the reinstatement of parental rights resolves the issues presented by the Bakers in chancery court, we remand this case to the chancery court for the transfer of jurisdiction over the remaining issues to the Juvenile Court of Shelby County where the modification of custody hearing originated.
该上诉法院的判决被推翻。当重获父母权后，也就解决了在chancery法院由贝克提出的问题，我们押还这个案件给chancery法院和管辖权移交遗留问题的Shelby县青少年法庭，在那里已经开始了监护权的修改。
We direct the chancery court to complete this transfer within twelve days of the entry of this judgment. Cf. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-118(e)(4)(A) (2005). The Juvenile Court of Shelby County is directed to consider, prepare, and implement a plan to resolve the pending custody matter with a view toward reunification of A.M.H. with her natural parents, Shao-Qiang (“Jack”) He and Qin (“Casey”) Luo, in a manner that minimizes trauma to the child.
我们指令chancery法院在12个本判决生效日内完成这项转移，比照美国田纳西州代码安，§ 36-1-118（e）（4）（A）（2005）。责令Shelby县青少年法庭考虑、准备、并执行一个计划去解决等待已久的监护权事宜，处理该事宜要本着这样一种看法，即重新使贺梅与他的亲生父亲贺绍强和母亲罗秦团聚，并尽量减少对儿童的创伤。
The attorney ad litem and guardian ad litem are hereby ordered relieved of any further participation in proceedings concerning A.M.H. The costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellees, Jerry L. Baker and Louise K. Baker, for which execution may issue if necessary. The Clerk of this Court is directed to send a copy of this opinion and judgment to the Juvenile Court of Shelby County.
（本法官）命令审案的律师和诉讼监护人解除任何与贺梅有关的进一步参与和诉讼。所有的诉讼费用全部由Jerry L. Baker 和 Louise K. Baker承担，为此，在必要时可以发出执行令。（本法官）指令该法院的书记员发送有关意见和判断到Shelby县青少年法庭。
（注：以上英文部分引自：http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPINIONS/TSC/PDF/071/AMHOPN.pdf；中文是若迷翻译的，其中参考了孙平网友的部分翻译。）
作者：若迷 在 驴鸣镇 发贴, 来自 http://www.hjclub.org
地方法院与最高法院判决词中有关贺梅监护权的部分及翻译：
