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作者：芦笛 在 罕见奇谈 发贴, 来自 http://www.hjclub.org
懒得跑大学图书馆，随便在网上抓一把，立即就能看出老芦是否造谣：
一、支持意见：
A. Korea 1949-1953
Dr. Richard L. Langill Professor, Political Science/History
Saint Martin's College
http://homepages.stmartin.edu/Fac_Staff/rlangill/PLS%20310/Korea%201949-Isaac.
htm
Meanwhile, in Washington the Truman administration completed its review
of Far Eastern strategy in NSC-48/2. This called for a hands-off policy
with regard to Taiwan, and concentrated instead on essential US interests
elsewhere in the Pacific, especially with regard to Japan and Southeast Asia.
In January 1950, for a National Press Club briefing in Washington, Acheson
outlined US interests in the Far East, and carelessly left out any mention
of Korea. This sent an ambiguous signal to Pyongyang - and to Moscow.
Kim Il Sung repeatedly asked for permission from Stalin, and later from
Mao, to launch an attack on South Korea to re-unite the Korean peninsula
under the Red flag. But Stalin resisted this idea, doubtful of the US response.
Stalin was still respecting agreements made with the United States at the
end of the war, and in early 1949 he was preoccupied with the crisis in
Berlin. Despite several further requests by Kim, Stalin again concluded
in September 1949 that the risks of American intervention were too great,
and he once more vetoed an invasion.
B. The Korean War
http://www.fsmitha.com/h2/ch24kor.html
On January 12, 1950, at a National Press Club briefing, Secretary of State
Acheson spoke of American interests in the Far East and described a defense
parameter that was similar to MacArthur's. Acheson said nothing about defending
South Korea from an attack by North Korea.
A document fundamental to the Truman Administrations foreign policy was
the National Security Council (NSC) 48/2, which focused on stopping Communist
expansion by giving economic and military aid to various countries: to the
French in their fight against Ho Chi Minh, to the Philippines government
in its fight against the Huk guerrillas, and to the British in their fight
against guerrillas in Malaya. There was in the document no mention of U.S.
military intervention anywhere, including defending Chiang's forces on Taiwan.
The Communists in Moscow and in North Korea apparently foresaw no quick
move by Washington to send troops to defend the Republic of Korea. On January
30, Stalin informed Kim Il Sung in a telegram that he was now willing to
help Kim in his plan to unify Korea. In the discussions with Kim that followed,
Stalin suggested that he wanted lead and said that a yearly minimum of 25,000
tons would help. He advised Kim to minimize risk, the cautious Stalin apparently
believing that it was possible to win a quick victory and present the world
with a fait accompli.
C. Causes of the War
http://www.historycentral.com/korea/causes.html
Japan had effectively occupied Korea since 1904. In the waning days of World
War II, an agreement was reached between the United States and the Soviet
Union: the Soviets would occupy South Korea only as far as the 38th parallel.
The United States forces that arrived in Korea were wholly unprepared for
their duties in Korea, not understanding its history and relationship with
Japan. To many Koreans, independence and unification were their most important
goals.
The United States, after much fumbling, supported Syngman Rhee, a Korean
nationalist who had been exiled to the United States in 1907. The United
States asked the United Nations to settle the issue of a divided Korea.
Despite Soviet objections, a United Nations commission voted for elections
in Korea. The communists in the South boycotted the election, and refused
to allow it in the North. In the South, conservative parties allied with
Rhee received a majority of the vote, in an election in which 80% of eligible
Korean voters took part. Rhee became President of the newly-declared independent
South Korea in October 1948. The Soviets installed Kim el Song as the leader
of the North.
As the United States drew down its military in the post war period, the
American garrison of 40,000 quickly withered to a force of 472 officers
and men who made up the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). The Korean
army, known as ROK, was given only light weapons. The North Korean Army,
on the other hand, was heavily equipped with tanks and other armored vehicles.
The communist victory in China, combined with the first Soviet nuclear tests
in 1949, resulted in a new US policy of containment in Asia. The policy,
called NSC 48/2, called for the containment to be primarily non-military,
with economic and military aid given to non-communist regimes in Asia.
On January 5, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, speaking at the National
Press Club, articulated the American policy. He spoke of those countries
that the US would defend with force: Japan, the Rykus islands and the Philippine
Islands. Korea was left out. The withdrawal of the last American forces
from Korea, as well as North Korean Kim's conviction that the US would not
intervene, convinced the North Koreans to attempt to unify the country by
force. The Soviets, led by Stalin, and the Chinese, led by Mao, concurred
with both Kim's judgement about the United States and his plans to unify
the country by force. In June, he struck.
二、反驳意见
请注意，反对意见是近年随着苏联档案解密后才出现的，我并不完全同意，当在专
文中再作分析。请注意，就在下面这些文字里，也可看到认为艾奇逊演说为斯大林
开了绿灯过去一直是舆论界共识，就连艾森豪威尔也是造谣犯，所以，老芦顶多只
能算传谣。
A. Historians debunk some popular myths about the war
University times The faculty and staff newspaper
of the University of Pittsburgh Volume 32 Number 21
June 22, 2000
On Jan. 12, 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivered a famous
speech at the National Press Club in which he failed to include South Korea
in America's defense perimeter in the Pacific.
Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, campaigning in the 1952 presidential election, charged
that Acheson's omission "gave the green light" to a North Korean invasion
because it convinced the Communists that America would not defend the south.
Historians and military analysts would debate the charge's merits, but a
public consensus emerged that the Truman administration had bungled by signaling
North Korea, China and the Soviet Union that the United States considered
South Korea to be expendable.
However, recently declassified Soviet documents and Chinese documents available
prior to 1989's Tiananmen Square crackdown indicate that Acheson's address
"had little if any impact on Communist deliberations," said James Matray,
professor of history at New Mexico State University.
Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin "worried about U.S. military intervention
until the moment the Korean War began," Matray said. "Moreover, he feared
that North Korea could not survive an attack that he was certain South Korea
would stage in the future. His approval of [North Korean leader] Kim Il Sung'
s plan was a mistake, but it derived from a sense of weakness rather than
strength."
Acheson's speech was, in fact, a judicious statement that enunciated Truman's
emphasis on economic assistance in Asia rather than military power, according
to Matray. "Outlining the U.S. 'defensive perimeter' was a secondary issue
in Acheson's speech that reflected, in part, concern that President Syngman
Rhee of South Korea might resort to military aggression against the north
to achieve reunification. The secretary of state was attempting to caution
the South Koreans that the United States would not guarantee absolutely
[South Korea's] military security," Matray said.
Acheson was outraged at being blamed for the war. He hadn't specifically
included Australia or New Zealand in America's Pacific defense perimeter
either, he pointed out in his memoirs, yet no one could have doubted the
West's commitment to those countries. The United States' first Asian mutual
defense agreement had been with South Korea, something that the Communists
could not have overlooked, Acheson wrote.
Acheson's Press Club speech isn't even mentioned in Soviet documents, Matray
found in his research. Instead, the voluminous memos, letters and cables
show how cleverly North Korea's dictator played his mutually antagonistic
allies, Stalin and Mao Zedong, off each other, Matray said. "Kim Il Sung
displayed remarkable political talent, as he manipulated his patrons into
supporting his plan for invasion. He was able to persuade Stalin and Mao
that his forces would achieve victory before the United States could intervene,
not because the Americans would not act to save South Korea."
B. Kathryn Weathersby spoke with American RadioWorks Correspondent John
Biewen.
Biewen: So how does this [sense of alarm] square with things perceived as
signals to the Soviet Union that Korea was not in our perimeter of defense?
Weathersby: Well, there was a very odd mixture of forces happening at this
time. We always have a mixture of forces happening at any given time. But
in the spring, in late '49 and early '50, what was happening is, on the
one hand, the U.S. had very severely demobilized after World War II. So our
armed forces were very small, they were very weak, they were under-funded.
They were not capable of very much, in a word.
And so when it came time to make a strategic policy in a kind of deliberate,
you know, let's think about it for a long time, create a lot of committees
and decide together how we're going to approach the world, the U.S. government
was very constrained by the limitation of its means. It's a little hard for
us to remember now because our means have been so great ever since the Korean
War. The Korean War very decisively ended this period and began an arms
race, the arms race that continued.
So the decision was reached in late '49 and formally adopted in a policy
paper called NSC 48. [The Departments of] State, War, [and the] Navy, [made
this] collective strategic policy statement that the U.S. would hold on
to its control of Japan and the Philippines and everything to the east -
in other words, all the islands that had been acquired by Japan at the end
of World War II, Hawaii and the west coast.
But it would not try to intervene to the west of that line, which would
mean not try to intervene in Taiwan or Korea or anywhere else on the Asian
mainland. The reason being not really so much that Taiwan was unimportant
or that Korea was unimportant but simply we didn't have the capacity to and
those two places were also seen as being less important than Japan, certainly.
But also, then, the Philippines that we had held since the end of the 19th
century. So it seemed like a really quite logical decision from that point
of view. Well, that decision then is what underlay Secretary of State Dean
Acheson's speech at that National Press Club in January, 1950 where he laid
out American determination as he saw it in Northeast Asia. In retrospect
many people have said that Dean Acheson's speech gave the green light to
the Soviets because Korea was excluded from the American defense perimeter.
So the Soviets thought, well, okay, then we'll go ahead and get it. To be
fair to the Secretary of State I would argue, and I've looked at this quite
closely, that the timing of the Soviet decision suggests that it was not
Dean Acheson's speech that made the difference, but rather Stalin had changed
his mind at the very beginning of January, probably because he found out
about NSC 48 from Donald Maclean, the British spy who was in Washington.
三、ＣＣＮ采访当事人
A. INTERVIEW WITH AMBASSADOR LUCIUS BATTLE-16/1/97
说明：
BATTLE是艾奇逊当时的助理，参与了该演说的准备，就连他也不敢说出Requiem
网友的话来，对那演说的解释跟Requiem 完全不一样。人家说得清清楚楚：如果侵
犯日本菲律宾阿留申等地，美国立刻就要出兵，而如果是别的地方，那就诉诸联合
国。
(ANA'S NOTE: LABEL ON AUDIO CASSETTE SAYS THAT BEGINNING OF PRESS CLUB ANSWER
IS MISSING - 20 SECS APPROX.)
LB: It somehow didn't come off. The night before the speech was to occur,
I went over to Acheson's house. Dean Rusk was there; Walt Butterworth, who
was assistant secretary for the Far East, was there; and I think Marshall
Schulman was there; and we worked until well into the evening, and finally
Mr Acheson said, "I don't like what we've written here. I'm going to do
this through notes, I'm going to do it myself," and he turned to me and
he said, "Luke, I will not come into the office tomorrow. If you need me,
come out here," and he said, "I will see you at the Press Club" - that was
to me. So I had no copy of the text, I did not know what he was working
on; he'd done all by notes himself. And he prepared an outline - it was
a masterful speech, and the speech was to define what our policy was to be
to China and to the area. In so doing, he defined parameters in which he
set our... there were certain areas, such as the Philippines, where we would
go to war immediately were it attacked; there were other areas we would
go to the UN, etc. He was defining these several areas of interest. And at
the time the speech was made, there was ... no attention was paid at all
to the parameter speech, to that portion of the speech. It was only after
the Korean War occurred and things went sour in Korea, that people began
to dig out that speech. I remember the Secretary said to me once: "Luke,
what did we say, what did I say?" So I pulled it out, and he said, "Let's
re-read it again. Suddenly this has emerged as a major issue." And we read
the portion with respect to the parameters, when he said, "Well, it's exactly
what we did: we did not... we went to the UN." So he felt that in effect
the speech had not done what many critics felt that it had done, and that
was invite Korea to attack ... North Korea to attack South Korea. I don't
think the evidence that has come forth over the years since then is persuasive
at all that that was the case. I think the attack occurred; it was probably...
that may have been a factor in it, but I doubt it.
INT: There was mood to change the perimeter that Acheson described even
before the start of the Korean War, wasn't there? Wasn't there this thing,
NSC 68, which was about changing the perimeter?
LB: Well, the NSC 68 has become a cottage industry of sorts. It was never...
(Laughs) It was a document that was overtaken by time; it was really a broad,
general, sweeping definition of what US policy had to be in the face of
the Cold War that was coming, and we were really already there, and particularly
the difficulties that we faced in Europe and in Asia. And it was never costed
out, iwas never really... it was postponed, action on it was postponed;
it was never turned down, but neither did it really become policy.But I
think it interpreted the thoughts of a lot of people in the Department of
State primarily, and indeed in the Government at that time, but it caused
a great deal of division. NSC 68 was not a document that was accepted by...
George Kennan, for example, did not think it was the right course: he thought
it was overdone and grossly exaggerated the threat. Paul Nitze, who actually
wrote most of the NSC 68, thought it was the right course. So even within
the Department there were very strong differences of view with respect to
it. But the NSC, for some reason, has sort of haunted the past and comes
out constantly. I cannot tell you how many times I've been approached by
writers, historians, whatever, talking about NSC 68, as though it was some
masterful policy. It was in a sense a direction of policy, but it was never
costed out, it was never really implemented in its entirely, and it was
overtaken by the Korean War.
B. INTERVIEW WITH NILES BOND-2/2/97
说明：这位邦德先生是国务院负责朝鲜事务官员，请注意他证词中的两点：第一、
老艾没有把朝鲜包括在防御圈中。第二、他不能肯定那演说是否为斯大林开了绿灯。
INT: How did the State Department react or your part of the State Department
react to Acheson's Defence Perimeter speech of January 1950?
NB: Secretary Acheson made that speech at the National Press Club in Washington.
It wasn't a speech really. It was a talk, and he was speaking from informal
notes. He had no prepared text and because there was no prepared text, there
was nothing to clear with anybody, so we didn't even know he was gonna make
this statement until till it came out in the newspapers and we were informed
afterward. If that remark had been sent to us for clearance, we would not
have cleared it. Actually, Secretary Acheson was paraphrasing a statement
made 10 months earlier by General MacArthur to a British journalist, so
he wasn't there was nothing new about this and what he said was in fact the
position of the of the Pentagon and I think even of the State Department.
Korea was never mentioned in that statement, you remember, it was just the
line was drawn to leaving them on the outside. So it was really it there
was no real repercussion except regret we didn't think it was gonna be helpful.
INT: Do you feel that the speech in any way gave a green light to Communist
expansion in the Korean peninsula?
NB: I think that has to be just left for speculation until we get some more
documentation, if there is any. I would doubt very much whether it?I think
plans were underway for this long before that.
C. Interview with Mr. Robert J. Donovan
这位先生是老艾发表演说时在场的《纽约先驱论坛报》驻白宫记者。双方谈话证实
了艾奇逊演说在战争爆发后引起轩然大波，成了“臭名昭著”的演说。
INT: He was the person who made the famous defence perimeter speech, but
not necessarily famous at the time, but it became not only famous, it became
notorious. Can you tell us why Acheson defence perimeter speech of January
1950 was later seized upon and became a very notorious speech?
RD: Because people felt that Acheson, by not including the area of the Thirty
Eighth Parallel as part of America's defence perimeter, was an invitation
to the foe to move. If I answer your question... [Mumbles]
INT: You have answered it, but maybe you can just expand a little and mention
Korea, because the audience won't necessarily know where the Thirty Eighth
Parallel is. Can you explain why Acheson's failure to mention Korea in the
speech at all later attracted such adverse criticism?
RD: Well it was criticised for opening the way to a Communist advance in
Korea. In other words, the Communists would think that we would not respond,
because it was not part of our defence perimeter. As a matter of fact, our
defence perimeter, as we understood it then, were the islands under American
control, from the Elusions all the way down to the Marianas. But in this
case, it was interpreted as not making the land of Korea part of our defence
perimeter. Nothing much ever came of that, but it was used against the President
and Acheson. Now, am I making myself clear.
作者：芦笛 在 罕见奇谈 发贴, 来自 http://www.hjclub.org |
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老芦造谣？艾奇逊演说是否给斯大林入侵南韩开了绿灯？（西方文献和证词节选）
