lemon25
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作者：lemon25 在 驴鸣镇 发贴, 来自 http://www.hjclub.org
美国的《华尔街日报》发表社论，认为中共高层目前的人事更迭机制，正面临重大的挑战，早晚会有坦克车上街。
《金融时报》在题为「政变传言中的北京」的文章指，星期一晚北京流传，指因为薄熙来(专题)事件，周永康发动军事政变。周掌控中国的公安、检察院及法院。不过该报记者当晚开车经过被指出事的地区，看起来一切平静，无异常情况。
自本周一晚传中南海政变后，周永康一直没有在媒体亮相，而政治局9个常委中，胡锦涛、温家宝、习近平(专题)、李克强和李长春已相继亮相，另贾庆林、吴邦国、贺国强未现身。显然是为了平息传言，中央电视台22日晚《新闻联播》有提及周永康的消息，但无助辟谣，反加剧外界猜疑。
《新闻联播》播出周永康的消息，指他「致信」全国政法宣传工作会议祝贺，但周未有出镜。更引起外界生疑的，就是新华社3月21日报道中央政法委今年上半年将对省市县三级3300多名政法委书记进行集中培训，但全文并无提到周永康，尽管他是中央政法委的书记。
周永康是王立军(专题)事件发生后，据悉是9个政治局常委之中，唯一表态反对撤去薄熙来(专题)职务的常委，在3月9日两会期间，他更亲自莅临重庆代表团的会议，公开支持薄熙来(专题)。
在此同时，美国的《华尔街日报》发表社论，认为中共高层目前的人事更迭机制，正面临重大的挑战。社论称，所谓的政变传言竟然获得不少人深信不疑，甚至导致人民币债券信贷违约掉期上升，说明了上海帮和太子党与共青团隔代钦点的制度，已面临瓦解。
该报的社论指出，西方有些言论指中国的领导层比起西方民主选出的领袖更果断更聪明，此说或许有部分事实，但过去有没有因为伦敦或华盛顿的政变传闻而引起市场波动的情形呢？中共一天到晚说要维稳，正好显示它经常要提防自己人搞政变。
社论最后指出，我们只需仔细想想，中国领导层的人事更迭，不就是有时间表的宫廷政变吗？这不是一个稳定的机制，坦克车上街是早晚的事。
以下为《华尔街时报》英文社论原文：
Rumors of a coup in Beijing ricocheted around the Chinese Internet on Tuesday and even caused the cost of credit default swaps on Chinese debt to rise slightly. That's remarkable considering there wasn't one iota of evidence that shots were fired at the Diaoyutai State Guest House or tanks were taking to the streets, as viral microblog posts had it.
But then consider that a month ago, Wang Lijun, an official of vice ministerial rank, sought asylum in the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu. Last week, his boss Bo Xilai, the popular party secretary of Chongqing, was dismissed from his post six months before a national leadership transition. In these strange days, it's easy to see why Chinese citizens may believe reports of a coup.
China is supposed to have "institutionalized" its leadership transitions so that such an upheaval could never happen. The outgoing Politburo Standing Committee hands over power to the anointed party general secretary and premier and picks the rest of the new Politburo. The Standing Committee also selects the two slightly younger men who will take over the top jobs 10 years down the road.
But is this arrangement really so stable? Power is now shared on an alternating basis by the Shanghai or "princeling" faction (former Party Secretary Jiang Zemin and the presumptive next one, Xi Jinping) and the Communist Youth League faction (current Party Secretary Hu Jintao). This sets up a dynamic of the current ruling faction sharing power with its presumptive successors in the other faction, a delicate balance to maintain over time.
And because paramount leader Deng Xiaoping picked Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, this year will mark the first transition not determined by the revolutionary generation. In 2002, Jiang Zemin tried to prolong his hold on power and pack the new Politburo with his proteges. No doubt Hu Jintao is trying to do the same.
The party has been able to keep internal strife under control by avoiding ideological struggle over the last 20 years. The factions have competed for important posts and the spoils of power, but they ruled by consensus. The public was simply told to believe in the myth of a monolithic party and ignore the men squabbling behind the curtain.
This technocratic pragmatism may now be breaking down. For instance, Bo Xilai appealed to leftists' disgust with bourgeois individualism and public unhappiness with income inequality, a tactic that alarmed some leaders. Since his dismissal, leftist websites and commentators have also been silenced.
But there are plenty of other voices on the "right" advocating liberal political reform. Ten years ago, the prospect of achieving middle-class incomes made most intellectuals unwilling to rock the boat. Now they feel secure enough to demand more rights. The party sees this as evidence of Western infiltration, and it is tightening control over the media and launching new campaigns to promote the spirit of self-sacrifice.
This return of ideology could make it difficult for the party to apportion power neatly between the factions. This time, Bo Xilai was replaced by Zhang Dejiang, a more moderate member of the same faction. But if the factions come to stand for policy platforms, they will naturally start to play for keeps. Instead of rotating through positions as they currently do, politicians and their proteges will develop personal strongholds, especially in the military. From there it's a short hop to a real coup attempt like the one Mao's designated successor Lin Biao was supposedly plotting in 1971, before he died in a mysterious plane crash.
The Western commentariat likes to praise Chinese leaders as more intelligent and decisive than those chosen by democratic elections. Sometimes that may be true. But when was the last time rumors of a coup in Washington or London moved markets? The endless chanting of the "protect stability" mantra by Communist Party functionaries is a reminder that the regime is constantly on guard against attempts by its own members to usurp power.
When you get right down to it, what are China's leadership transitions if not palace coups on a regular schedule? That's not a stable institution. It's an invitation, sooner or later, for tanks in the streets. [ 俺想说几句 ] [ 查看网友评论( 17 ) ]
作者：lemon25 在 驴鸣镇 发贴, 来自 http://www.hjclub.org
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华尔街日报：中国权力更迭制度不稳 坦克车上街早晚的事
