唐好色
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作者：唐好色 在 罕见奇谈 发贴, 来自 http://www.hjclub.org
今天去圖書館, 隨便走走看到一本[二戰簡史], 作者 James Stokesbury. 想到這裡的討論, 就拿下來看了看, 結果說的幾乎和我說的相同. 早就說過, 這根本就是常識. 外借出來, 摘要如下:
On August 21, it was announced that Germany and Russia were concluding a nonaggression pack; it was signed in Moscow two days later.
In the West this was regarded with horror as a typical example of Communist duplicity. From Stalin’s point of view it was far different; he was faced with a simple either-or proposition: either he could ally with Britain and France, in which case there would be a war, a war that Russia was expected to fight while Britain and France sat and waited it out, after which, when Germany and Russia had destroyed each other, France and Britain would move in and pick up the pieces; or, he could make a deal with Hitler, they could divide Poland between them, Hitler would (probably) turn west, and Germany, France, and Britain would fight it out, after which Stalin would move in and pick up the pieces. However distressing the course of European history since 1939, Stalin can hardly be blamed for making the choice he did. Britain and France wanted to use him to gain time and to fight their war; he wanted to use Britain and France to gain time and to fight his war – and he did.
Not only that, but it is possible his deal enabled Russia to survived the ordeal that lay ahead. Part of the pact was a secret agreement that Poland would be partitioned between Russia and Germany. This was carried out, and it had the effect of moving the Russian frontier more than a hundred miles west into Poland. Some writers claim that without that extra hundred-mile cushion, the German offensive against Russia in 1941 would have succeeded, and Russia would have been destroyed. It may be, then paradoxically, that the deal that enabled Hitler to defeat Poland cost him the war.
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The big question of the 1939 campaign is not what happened to Poland, or to Germany or Russia, but what happened to France and Great Britain. At a time when the Germans were almost completely committed in Poland, why did Britain and France not strike quickly and hard? This was what the Poles expected as help from their allies; this was, in effect, what Poland died for.
The saddest aspect of the whole matter is that the Western Allies could have done so. There is virtually no doubt that had they attacked vigorously, they could have broken through the thin screen of Germans to and across the Rhine. They could and should have easily defeated Germany, and the Second Wordl War would never have gotten off the ground.
The French were fully mobilized while the Germans were still enmeshed in Poland. Facing the German frontier they had eighty-five divisions. Some of them were not fully worked up, but the lowest estimate by military experts gives the French seventy-two divisions. Against them the Germans had eight weak regular divisions, and about twenty-five4 reserve formations, some of them existing on paper, some made up largely of recruits who were not even half-trained. The Germans had 300 guns, the French had 1600. The French had 3200 tanks; the Germans had none—they were all in Poland. The French and British together had 1700 aircraft; the Germans had almost none.
The French did undertake an offensive operation. They sent out patrols that penetrated about fourteen miles into German territory; they met no opposition. They then withdrew on order and never advanced again.
The royal Air Force before the war had deliberately assumed a policy of building up a strategic bomber force. Now, with nearly 800 serviceable bombers against a virtually defenseless western Germany, it announced that its policy was not to use bombers, but to conserve and build them up further. It would never again achieve a force ratio of 800 to nothing.
作者：唐好色 在 罕见奇谈 发贴, 来自 http://www.hjclub.org |
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[二戰簡史]如是說
