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 波士顿环球报导 -- 中国第一? 不必太紧张. |
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飞云
加入时间: 2004/02/14
文章: 4072
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作者：飞云 在 罕见奇谈 发贴, 来自 http://www.hjclub.org
记者 : 痨死.特溜
2005年, 11月16日, 星期三.
发自于麻省剑桥: 当米国总统布殊在今星期将和中国胡主席同卓共餐时, 他会反思是否像很多人所假设那样,中国崛起意味着米国失落.
不必太在意. 米国经济份量是中国的7倍, 日本是中国的3倍. 最少, 中国是一个如15年前大部份都烟消云散的列宁式政体.
中国的外交政策是找寻国内稳定最大化(例如维持新疆与中亚边界现状)和保持使人印象深刻的经济曾长速度(例如稳保米国的庞大市场). 第三目标是保持周边14个复杂邻居的地缘政治和平环境. 这是一项谨慎的外政策, 至今一切尚好.
中国还有两个含糊目标. 一是在亚洲取代米国成为主影响力源. 所以中国努力在米国和日本之间挿入楔子, 和在澳洲人耳边吹风说澳洲人最好望向亚洲, 而非太平洋另一边. 另一目标是"收复"北京觉得属於自己的土地. 这不只台湾, 但还包括许多中国东面和南面的小岛, 和最终"收复"北京曾经声称拥有主权的俄罗斯远东部份地区.
北京能否达成这些目标要基于北京政治系统能否生存下来, 和其他强权对中国野心的反应. 中国中产阶段推促物业产权, 农村不满, 网路扩散, 失业和人口急速老化所带来的金融和社会负担, 都生动地表演出列宁主义式的市场所带来的矛盾. 在经济上跑一条路而在政治上又跑另一条路是不会达到预定目标的.
中国经济或许以现今速度继续增长. 或者中国可以保持列宁主义党式的国家. 但是二者很难兼具. 迟早只能经济体制或政治之道的其中之一, 占优跑出.
要成功地跃升为新第一, 除了本身有志气和有能力外, 然而更重要是要得到会被影响的强权认可.
后一种情况极不太可能实现. 米国不会让一个有一班跟后盟友的极权中国成为新的世界领导人. 日本的魄力和印度的份量也是主要因素. 北京若敢在亚洲追求门罗主义的自身版本, 华盛顿会依重澳洲, 印尼, 和越南来抵制中国.
如同上世纪一样, 米国在亚洲的利益在于保持中国和日本的平衡, 和不让任何一方超越另一方. Equally, a Japan that saw China eclipse the United States, its major ally whose primacy in East Asia explains six decades of Japanese restraint, would surely challenge China.
米国的中国政策应该混合全接触和阻挡北京扩张主义而保东亚平衡. 这种双姿态并不矛盾. 毕竟有两个中国, 一个是下沉的指令式经济体和一个飞腾的自由经济体. 一个争抓存在理由的共产党和有13亿各有各事的个体. 要提防极权中国同时又要接触新兴的中国, 这是一项理性的二元主义.
北京扩张主义者的要求是今日强权中独一无二的, 但其制度是一个理性独裁政体, 在过去的四分一世纪中, 它耐性地去实施它的目标. 它也肯定认识到其他国家, 有各种理由拒绝中国成为中心之国的机会. 如果北京继续面对对抗性的平衡, 会维持东亚和平, 它可能会小心谨慎地去做事.
在最近两次参访了北京, 上海, 西安, 和重庆, 有关中国即将遮替(取代)米国的声音, 比在米国学校内和米国传媒中少听了. 总之, 中国也许不会成为的新巨人, 显现在它的自制敌人和远方贪图安逸的人面前. 一个列宁主义者统治的, 能取替米国的超级中国, 不会在视野之内.
............ 英文全文 ...................
China No. 1? Don't hold your breath
Ross Terrill The Boston Globe
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 2005
CAMBRIDGE, Massachusetts: As George W. Bush readies his chopsticks to dine with President Hu Jintao of China this week, he might ponder whether China's rise really means America's eclipse, as so many seem to assume.
Don't count on it. The U.S. economy is seven times the size of China's and the Japanese economy is three times China's. Not least, China is a Leninist regime - the kind that mostly went up in a puff of smoke 15 years ago.
China's foreign policy seeks to maximize stability at home (for example, by keeping the status quo across Xinjiang's borders with Central Asia) and to sustain its impressive economic growth (for example, by safeguarding the huge U.S. market). A third goal is to maintain peace in its complicated geographic situation, with no fewer than 14 abutting neighbors. So far so good. This is a prudent foreign policy.
But China also has two dubious goals. One is to replace the United States as the chief source of influence in East Asia. Hence Chinese efforts to drive a wedge between Japan and the United States and Chinese whispers in Australian ears that Canberra would be better off looking only to Asia and not across the Pacific. The other is to "regain" territories that Beijing feels fall within its sovereignty. These include not only Taiwan but a large number of islands east and south of China and, eventually, portions of the Russian Far East to which Beijing has laid territorial claims in the past.
Whether Beijing can achieve these goals depends on how long its rigid political system can survive, and on the reaction of other powers to China's ambitions. A middle-class push for property rights, rural discontent, the spread of the Internet, unemployment and a suddenly aging population bringing financial and social strains all dramatize the contradictions inherent in "market Leninism." Traveling one road in economics and another in politics does not make for a settled destination.
China's economy may continue to grow at its present rate. Or China may retain its Leninist party state. But it can hardly do both. Either the economic or the political logic will soon gain the upper hand.
The successful rise of a new No. 1 entails not only ambition and capacity on the part of that rising power but also - crucially - acquiescence by other affected powers.
This last condition is extremely unlikely to be fulfilled. The United States will not allow an authoritarian China to become the new world leader and has allies to call on. Japan's new assertiveness and India's weight are major factors. And should Beijing seek to pursue a Chinese version of the Monroe Doctrine inAsia, Washington could also count on Australia, Indonesia and Vietnam for balancing weight.
American interests in Asia lie, as they have for the past century, in keeping China and Japan in balance, and not allowing either one to forge ahead of the other. Equally, a Japan that saw China eclipse the United States, its major ally whose primacy in East Asia explains six decades of Japanese restraint, would surely challenge China.
America's China policy should blend full engagement with preserving an equilibrium in East Asia that discourages Beijing from expansionism. No contradiction exists between these twin stances. There are two Chinas, after all. A command economy that sags and a free economy that soars. A Communist Party that scratches for a raison d'être and 1.3 billion individuals with private agendas. Being wary of authoritarian China yet engaging with emerging China is a reasonable dualism.
Beijing's expansionist claims are unique among today's powers. But the regime is a rational dictatorship that has, for the past quarter-century, been patient in fulfilling its goals. It surely realizes that others have a variety of reasons for denying China the opportunity to be a 21st-century Middle Kingdom. If Beijing continues to be faced with a countervailing equilibrium that keeps the peace in East Asia, it will probably act prudently.
In Beijing, Shanghai, Xian and Chongqing, on two recent visits, I found less talk of China being near to eclipsing the United States than I do on U.S. campuses and in the U.S. media. Overall, China may not be the new colossus it appears to its self-made foes or to distant lotus-eaters. A Leninist-ruled Chinese superpower eclipsing the United States is not on the horizon.
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/11/16/opinion/edterrill.php
作者：飞云 在 罕见奇谈 发贴, 来自 http://www.hjclub.org |
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- “中国魁首？请莫屏息以待。” -- 邋遢道士 - (58 Byte) 2005-11-18 周五, 上午2:05 (68 reads)
- 很好的. -- 飞云 - (185 Byte) 2005-11-18 周五, 上午2:34 (59 reads)
- 试试看，未必“达意”！ -- 邋遢道士 - (456 Byte) 2005-11-18 周五, 上午3:40 (62 reads)
- 謝. -- 飞云 - (196 Byte) 2005-11-18 周五, 上午4:56 (53 reads)
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